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DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES: IS LIMITED 
COST INTERNALIZATION ACTUALLY 
SMART GROWTH? 
NICK ROSENBERC* 
Abstract: Sprawl has defined development in the United States for the 
past fifty years. As people have moved from the cities to the suburbs, 
communities have been faced with staggering infrastructure, social, and 
environmental costs. Many municipalities have attempted to recoup 
costs of this development by imposing impact fees-charges on 
development used to pay for necessary public sefYices. Many 
environmental and smart growth advocates have embraced impact fees 
as a cost-internalizing approach to regulating growth. Federal and state 
courts, however, have placed substantial constraints on the scope of the 
costs that municipalities are able to recover through impact fees. 
Furthermore, because the most direct infrastructure costs are more 
readily recouped, development may occur in areas where the lack of 
these sefYices would otherwise have been prohibitive, while remaining 
social costs are borne by society at large. This Comment cautions local 
governments to be wary of using impact fees as a tool to address the 
broader impacts of sprawl, and urges them to balance the benefits of 
limited cost recovery with the effect of accommodating growth that 
might otherwise not occur. 
INTRODUCTION 
Life in and around urbanized areas in the United States has 
changed dramatically, and at a staggering pace, in the last fifty years. 1 
The distinction between urban and rural has been replaced by a sub-
urban landscape that is nearly ubiquitous for much of the country's 
population. People have been moving out of the dense inner cores of 
* Note Editor, BOSlDN COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2002-03. The 
author would like to thank Jon Witten and the law review staff for their invaluable assis-
tance, as well as his family for their support throughout. 
1 See Robert Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, The Evolution of the Sprawl Debate ill the United 
States, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw.j. ENVTI,. L. & POL'y 137,139 (1999); Ken Snyder & Lori Byrd, 
Paying the Costs of Sprawl: Using Fair-Share Costing to Control Sprawl 3 (1998), at 
http://www.sustainable.doe.gov/articles/sprawl.pdf (last modified Apr. 29, 1999). 
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built-up cities and settling in outlying areas. 2 This movement has been 
facilitated by many factors and has had profound consequences. 
"Sprawl development," as this pattern has been termed, necessitates 
the conversion of lands to residential use.3 It is characterized by sub-
urban growth, occurs at relatively low densities, and consumes large 
amounts of land that are less valuable as open space or wildlife habitat 
than as subdivisions.4 It increases distances between people, their jobs, 
and other essentials like shopping and entertainment, and contrib-
utes to staggering increases in automobile travel and the associated 
impacts on traffic and air quality.5 Longer commutes, traffic, con-
sumption of open spaces, and low-density development have brought 
high costs to the communities experiencing this growth.6 
The most visible and immediate costs are attributable to the pro-
vision of necessary services and infrastructure to support new devel-
opment.7 In recent decades, communities have recognized that exist-
ing sewers, roads, and other infrastructure cannot support this new 
growth.s This growth requires the construction of new facilities for 
which the general public has traditionally borne the COSt,9 In addi-
tion, as the costs of sprawl have been studied more closely, many areas 
have identified other impacts on resources vital to a healthy commu-
nity, such as, the capacity of schools, the availability of parks and rec-
reation areas, air quality, wildlife habitat, and other less direct but 
significantly impacted community assets.1O In order to recover the 
monetary costs of providing these needed services, some local gov-
ernments have imposed "impact fees" as a way to ensure that develop-
ers internalize these costs instead of allowing them to externalize 
them to the larger community.l1 
This Comment addresses the constitutional and other legal limi-
tations on the scope of impacts that such fees can address. Part 
I discusses the range of impacts that come with unbridled sprawl de-
2 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
g Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3. 
4 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
5 Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 137; Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 8. 
6 See discllssion infra Part I.B. 
7 See Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 10-11; discllssion infra Part I.B.1. 
B See Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 11. 
9 See disclIssion infra Part I.C. 
10 See disclission infra Part I.B. 
11 Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Impact Fecs: .411 Answer to Local Governmellts' Capital 
FUlldillgDilclIIlIIa, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 417 (1981); see iI/Fa text accompanying note 
74. 
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velopment. Part II identifies the major legal hurdles that valid impact 
fees must overcome, namely a body of jurisprudence that increasingly 
restricts the uses and subject matter for impacts fees. Part III com-
pares these legal constraints and the impacts of sprawl to describe 
how fees will be unlikely to internalize the true costs effectively, or, for 
that matter, even a bare minimum of the actual costs, of sprawl. Fi-
nally, this Comment suggests that given these constraints, impact fees 
should be approached with caution. This is because fees may in fact 
enable sprawl to occur by accommodating development more than it 
is able to mitigate its actual impacts. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF SPRAWL 
The dominant pattern of development and growth in the United 
States over the last fifty years has been defined by a single word: 
sprawP2 The manifestations of sprawl are apparent in most parts of 
the country: there has been, and continues to be, a dramatic shift in 
population from central cities outward.13 This migration of people is 
accompanied by new homes and other social, economic, and com-
mercial markings of developed society, and characterizes much of the 
landscape around the once-dense central cities.14 Local governments 
have turned to impact fees to recover the costs associated with sprawl, 
and these fees face a number of restrictive constitutionallimitations.15 
A. A Pattern of OlltwaTd Growth 
The tremendous increase in population in the past fifty years 
around metropolitan areas has occurred predominantly in outlying 
suburbs.16 In 1950, sixty percen t of the population living in metropoli-
tan areas lived within the "central cities" of those areasP By 1990, the 
12 Sec Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 139; Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3. 
13 Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3. 
14 Id. 
15 Sec discussion supra Part I. 
16 Burchell & Shad, mpra note 1, at 139. 
17 Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3. A central city is the largest place within a metro-
politan area, as defined by the Office of Management and Budget. Sec U.S. CENSUS Bu-
REAU, 2000 CENSUS app. A at 16 (2000). These can include: (1) census designated places 
(densely settled concentrations of population that are identifiable by name, but not legally 
incorporated places); (2) incorporated places (places reported in the 1990 Census and 
after, legally recognized under the laws of their respective states as cities, boroughs, towns, 
or villages); or (3) consolidated cities (units of local government for which the functions 
of an incorporated place and its county or minor civil division have merged). Id. app. A at 
15-18. 
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population living in the same metropolitan areas nearly doubled, 
while the proportion of those living in the central cities fell to about 
one-third.18 By other estimates, the proportion of the population liv-
ing in suburbs increased from fifteen percent in 1940, to roughly sixty 
percent in the late 1990s.19 
A major concern related to this pattern of sprawl is the distinc-
tion between the type of land in central cities and that outside of cit-
ies consumed by this growth.2o The land in cities is typically comprised 
of previously developed, densely populated areas characterized by the 
efficient use of resources.21 By contrast, areas outside of cities often 
have few public services, and are comprised of open space, agricul-
tural land, critical wildlife habitat, or other minimally developed and 
undeveloped land.22 
Another concern is the form that development takes as it moves 
away from an urban core.23 Although environmental impacts are in-
herent in all development, they are exacerbated by the form that this 
growth has taken in suburban areas.24 "Sprawl" is an imprecise term. 
Commentators, however, have identified key elements of this growth 
that are common to many metropolitan areas and are important in 
describing the causes of, and potential cures for, the impacts of sprawl 
development. 25 According to one definition, the defining characteris-
tic of sprawl development is "low-density development outside city 
centers, usually on previously undeveloped land."26 In a view more 
critical of local government action, or, in this case, inaction, this de-
velopment has been more cynically described as "the pattern that 
takes over when, with little coordinated planning, people and busi-
nesses desert established communities to develop the open country-
side."27 
18 Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3. 
19 Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 139. 
20 See Douglas R. Porter, Reinventing Growth Management for the 21st Century, 23 WM. & 
MARY ENvn. L. & POL'y REV. 705, 711-13 (1999). 
21 See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 140-41; Porter, supra note 20, at 711-13. 
22 See Porter, supra note 20, at 711-13. 
23 [d. 
24 See id. 
25 See, e.g., Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 140-41; Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth at 
CentulY's End: The State of the States, 31 URB. LAW. 601, 604 (1999); Snyder & Byrd, supra 
note 1, at 3. 
26 Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3. 
27 Salkin, supra note 25, at 604 (quoting Editorial, Smart Growth Bills Bow to Reality: Fight 
Sprawl or Watch it Get H'tme, BUFFALO NEWS, May 3, 1998, at H2). 
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costs on the community at large.36 Construction of single-family 
homes on lesser-developed land demands levels of public service that 
often do not exist.37 
In addition, some contend that the impacts on the land itself, 
and on other resources, create secondary impacts on wildlife habitat 
and water quality.38 Sprawl development has also been recognized for 
its secondary impacts on the social, economic, and aesthetic welfare 
of surrounding communities.39 A major challenge in addressing these 
secondary costs is in identifYing and quantifYing them. 40 The costs to 
natural resources and other remote costs are often ignored, under-
valued, or camouflaged-their connection to suburban growth pat-
terns hidden.41 They are also difficult to quantify, even where the 
causal connections are apparent and the burden on the community is 
significan t. 42 
1. Direct Costs of Services and Capital Improvements 
The direct costs of services are perhaps the most easily recog-
nized costs of sprawl. These include the sewers, roads, wastewater 
treatment, and other infrastructure that must be extended or en-
hanced to meet the needs of increased development beyond existing 
facilities or capacities.43 While the costs associated with modest growth 
have been reasonable in the past, and inexpensive to expand as 
needed, the costs are rising dramatically because of a combination of 
unbridled growth and the decline in federal investment and other 
support for public services.44 
2. Costs of Hard to Quanti.fY and Non-Exclusive Amenities 
In addition to the direct capital investments that a municipality 
must make to accommodate growth, communities often bear the costs 
36 E.g .• Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 140-42 (noting that sprawl creates sizable ef-
fects on the consumption of agricultural and ecologically-sensitive land, automobile de-
pendence, and quality of life); Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3 (describing hidden costs 
of sprawl, such as traffic congestion and the loss of open space). 
37 See Porter, supra note 20, at 710-11; Snyder & Byrd. supra note 1, at 8. 
38 Porter, supra note 20, at 710-11; Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 8. 
39 See Porter. supra note 20, at 711-12. 
4°Id. 
41 Id. at 712 (citing HENRY L. DIAMOND & PATRICK F. NOONAN, LAND USE IN NIERICA 
1 (1996)). 
42 Burchell & Shad. sllpra note 1, at 146. 
43 E.g., Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 10-11. 
44 !d. at 13. 
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Development outward from central cities is rarely contiguous, 
and often results in residential and non-residential uses being spatially 
segregated by long distances and divided into single-use districts.28 In 
addition, sprawl consumes open space, undeveloped land, and less-
developed land, which is often environmentally sensitive or ecologi-
cally significant.29 This land at the margin of development is generally 
less expensive and is attractive due to proximity to otherwise develop-
able tracts.30 Together, these characteristics describe a typical sprawl-
ing suburb that is the product of discontinuous development. This 
type of development "is primarily comprised of one- or two-story sin-
gle-family residential development on lots ranging in size from one-
third of an acre to one acre, ... accompanied by strip commercial de-
velopment and industrial parks. "31 This increases the distance be-
tween homes and services, and creates an increasing dependence on 
the automobile.32 The overall result is a large population, demanding 
the services of the city, spread throughout a larger area.33 
B. The Impacts oj Sprawl 
vVhat is it about this pattern of development that makes it such a 
challenge and concern for citizens, planners, and legislators? Al-
though many Americans clearly enjoy and seek the lifestyle associated 
with sprawling patterns of residential development, one theme that 
regularly emerges is its cost.34 IdentifYing and defining the costs of 
sprawl in this country's metropolitan areas has formed a contentious 
backdrop to the challenge of shaping the development of those 
communities.35 Most commentators recognize that this low-density, 
spatially discontinuous, and segmented pattern of growth imposes 
28 See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1. at 141. Such development is also called "leapfrog" 
or "skipped-over" development because suburban areas closer to the central city are cir-
cumvented. Id. at 137, 139. Sprawl development, therefore, is not a mere expansion of the 
dense urban cores, but rather a discontinuous pattern of land uses broken up along an 
outward spatial path, which makes the provision of services and efficient land use more 
difficult. !d. at 137, 141. 
29Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 137. 
32 Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 141, 150; Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 11. 
33 See Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 11. 
34 Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 138; Porter, supra note 20, at 711-13. 
35 E.g., Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 138. Suburban areas haw been described as a 
desirable location for retail stores and other amenities. Commentators have noted that 
many Anlericans value various aspects of suburban life, such as, safe gated communities, 
good schools, restaurants, and parks. See id. 
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associated with the indirect impacts of development on physical and 
infrastructure resources used by the general public. 45 Lost open space 
and parks place a burden on the entire community.46 Recreation and 
visual amenities are vital, as is the function of open space as wildlife 
habitat.47 Wetlands and streams are directly affected by the increase in 
impervious surfaces attributable to development.48 This leads to al-
tered water flow and increased runoff-representing a loss of flood 
control, threats to the water supply, and endangered natural habitat.49 
Though difficult to quantifY, and not exclusive to individual homes or 
developments, these resources are directly affected by growth and 
pose a significant resource cost to the surrounding communities.50 
3. Costs of Secondary and Associated Impacts 
Sprawl not only alters the physical landscape, but also has corre-
sponding effects on the social and economic patterns of a commu-
nity.51 These effects have been described by one commentator as the 
"insidious ... impacts on daily living. "52 Suburbanization increases 
traffic and commuting distances,53 draws economic investment away 
from cities,54 and segregates classes of individuals within spatial, aes-
thetic, and even literal boundaries.55 These impacts create secondary 
costs, such as: (l) the blighting of inner cities and the associated rein-
vestment or subsidization needed to maintain the quality of life in 
those communities; (2) air quality problems and the necessary in-
vestment in health care for associated respiratory illnesses; and (3) 
the need to invest in public transit to offset increases in commuter 
transit.56 The lifestyles of those living in areas characterized by sprawl 
45 See id. at 3. 
46 Id.; see also Porter, supra note 20, at 711-12 (describing the burden of sprawl on the 
"diversity, beauty, and health of surrounding landscape"). 
47 See Porter, supra note 20, at 711; Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3. 
48 Porter, supra note 20, at 710-11. 
49Id. 
50Id. 
51 Id. at 711-12. 
52 Id. at 711. 
53Id. 
54 Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 9-10. 
55 Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 138-41. Gated communities are a literal example 
of such boundaries. See id. 
56 Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl. 29 URB. LAW. 183, 
184 (1997); Porter, supra note 20. at 710-13; Snyder & Byrd. supra note 1, at 3. 
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create tangible social and quality of life costs,57 including lost produc-
tivity from traffic delays and longer commutes. 
Although the pattern of developing suburban areas represents 
the "sensible choices of many individual households" and offers a life-
style desired by many Americans, these choices "come at a collective 
price. "58 The costs described above are generally externalized for the 
broader community to bear.59 Although the impacts of growth have 
been studied for decades, secondary costs have been largely ig-
nored.60 It is only recently that total-cost accounting has played a role 
in growth policy.61 
In addressing the burden of these impacts, commentators, legis-
latures, planners, and courts have grappled with two key questions. 
First, how far can we, or should we, go in calculating the true costs 
and impacts of sprawl? Second, who should be responsible for these 
costs, the general public, or those profiting from, or living in, these 
developments?62 Underlying these concerns is whether the goal 
should be to recover identifiable costs, or to deter land uses that cause 
these impacts in the first place.63 In other words, should the so-called 
"polluter pays" principle be applied to discourage sprawl in areas less 
suited for it, or does it simply provide funding for services that allow 
more growth to occur by paying its way?64 
C. Add1'essing SjJrGwl: Fees as a Smart Growth Tool 
Although the roots of sprawl are complex,65 many have argued 
that the existing land use policies used by local governments encour-
age spraw1.66 They contend that, in pursuit of a larger tax base and 
economic development, many municipalities devise policies that en-
courage growth, fostering land consumption and devaluing in-fill de-
57 Porter, supra note 20, at 711-12. 
58 [d. at 710-11. 
59 [d. 
60 See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 142. 
61 See id. 
62 SeeJAMES C. NICHOLAS & DAN DAVIDSON, LAND USE RESEARCH FOUND., IMPACT FEES 
IN HAWAII: IMPLEMENTING STATE LAW 2 (1993). 
63 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Marketr Conflict Between Tradable Pollution iWow-
allces and tlte "Polluter Pays" Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 468-80 (2000). 
64 See id. The "polluter pays" principle is a regulatory approach ill which government 
requires that those responsible for pollution and environmental degradation bear the 
costs of remediation or other measures to keep environmental quality at a desired level. [d. 
at 467-68. 
65 Porter, supra note 20, at 710. 
66 See id. at 705,710-712. 
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velopment.67 These policies involve zoning for development beyond 
the carrying capacity of existing infrastructure, and requiring the 
provision of services necessary to accommodate the new growth.68 
However, as growth has continued at an unprecedented pace, 
municipalities have struggled to provide the additional services re-
quired and the hidden costs have become more apparent.69 Recogni-
tion that the economic costs of development may represent only a 
fraction of the total costs to the community has fueled the movement 
towards "smart growth "-a broad concept that ostensibly addresses 
suburban growth and its total costS.70 Smart growth policies are 
reflected in many state comprehensive plans that attempt to steer 
growth to the most suitable areas by, for example, limiting new devel-
opment to existing infrastructure service areas.71 Despite the growing 
acceptance of smart growth principles, many communities continue 
to accommodate growth by providing the essential services and have 
used other tools to recoup costs.72 Many have turned to the use of im-
pact fees-charges imposed on new development to recover the costs 
of necessary services-seeking to have developers internalize the costs 
of sprawl. 73 
II. IMPACT FEES DEFINED AND CHALLENGED 
The term impact fee has been broadly defined to include any 
"monetary charges imposed by local government on new develop-
ment to recoup or offset a proportionate share of public capital costs 
required to accommodate such development with necessary public 
facilities. "74 Within this definition, an important distinction exists be-
tween those charges that are imposed adjudicatively by a local permit-
ting authority75 and those identified and calculated legislatively by 10-
67 Id. at 712-13. In-fill deyelopment is a strategy for accommodating growth and pre-
venting sprawl, allowing greater density, and fostering efficiency in land-use development 
, .. ;thin existing urban boundaries. SMART COMTYS. NE'IWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, LAND 
USE PLANNING STRATEGIES-INFILL DEVELOPMENT, at http://www.sustainable.doe.gov/ 
landuse/infill.shtml (last modified Oct. 23, 2002). 
68 Scc Porter, supra note 20, at 712. 
69 SccSnyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 13. 
70 Scc id. 
71 Porter, supra note 20, at 720. 
72 Scc id. at 714. 
73 Scc NICHOLAS & DAVIDSON, supra note 62, at 2; Juergensmeyer, supra note 11, at 417. 
74 NICHOLAS & DAVIDSON, supra note 62, at 2. 
75 Id. at 2; scc James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, A Limitation on Developmcnt Impact 
Exactions to Limit Social Policy-Making: IntClprcting thc Takings Clausc to Limit Land Usc Policy-
MakillgjorSocial Hcifarc Goals oj Urban Communitics, 9 DICK.]. ENVTL. L. POL'y 1,96 (2000). 
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cal ordinance.76 The former are typically assessed on a case-by-case 
basis as a condition of a permit or other development approval. 77 
These are often referred to as "monetary exactions" or "in-lien fees," 
and are similar to the dedications of real property municipalities tra-
ditionally require to allow for infrastructure improvements. 78 Mone-
tary exactions are simply a required financial dedication to provide 
for services similar to those dedications of real property provide.79 
They allow for more flexibility by substituting a financial payment 
where a traditional dedication of land may not adequately address a 
particular impact.8o 
Fees imposed by local ordinance, on the other hand, are not de-
termined on an ad hoc basis, but rather are calculated to apportion 
the costs of additional capital facilities required for the new develop-
ment,81 These fees are assessed upon all similar developments, often 
on a per unit or per square foot basis.82 They ostensibly have the ad-
vantage of being applicable to smaller developments where land dedi-
cation would not be practical.83 Moreover, impact fees provide greater 
flexibility to finance off-site facilities than monetary exactions assessed 
by an adjudicative body.84 
Local governments have found that the costs of accommodating 
rapid growth outweigh the revenue generated by new development,85 
The ability of local governmen ts to provide the necessary services re-
quired by new development is exacerbated by a general decline in 
federal and state financing of infrastructure, such as, roads and other 
growth-sensitive services.86 For decades, many communities around 
76 See Holloway & Guy, supm note 75, at 97; Juergensmeyer, supm note II, at 418-20. In 
some cases, however, the term "impact fee" is applied only to those uniformly-applied, 
legislatively-identified costs. Fees assessed by adjudicative agencies are referred to as mone-
tary exactions, non-possessory monetary exactions, or in-lieu fees. Sec Ehrlich v. City of 
Culver City, 9II P.2d 429, 436 (Cal. 1996); Juergensmeyer, supra note II, at 418. In this 
Comment, the term "impact fee" is generally used to refer to legislatively enacted charges, 
and the distinction is noted where necessary. Sec Juergensmeyer, supra note II, at 418-20. 
77 Holloway & Guy, supra note 75. at 96. 
78 SeeJuergensmeyer. supm note II. at 418. 
79Id. 
80 Sec id. 
81 See id. 
82 Id. at 419. 
83 See id. at 420. 
84 SccJuergensmeyer. supra note II, at 420. 
85 See NICHOLAS & DAVIDSON, supm note 62. at 2; Holloway & Guy, supra note 75. at 27. 
86 See NICHOLAS & DAVIDSON, supra note 62. at 2-3 (discussing the decline in road 
financing as an indicator of the general trend away from public financing of similar 
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the country have imposed impact fees or exactions on residential, 
commercial, and industrial developments.87 
A. Scope and Apf}licability of Impact Fees 
Currently, many local governments impose impact fees and exac-
tions to recover the costs of a variety of services, including water and 
sewer infrastructure;88 road improvements to ease traffic congestion;89 
parks and recreation facilities;90 and social welfare programs, such as 
employment and job training, child care, and affordable housing.91 
However, as discussed in Part II.A.3 illfm, the scope of costs that can 
be recovered by impact fees is restricted by several legal considera-
tions, including the key regulatory takings tests articulated in Dolan v. 
City of TiganP2 and in state court decisions assessing the validity of im-
pact fees.93 The case law discusses several tests and standards, but 
leaves many of the contours undefined. Specifically, the question of 
which types of improve men ts, facilities, or services can be covered by 
a fee is particularly important in addressing the impacts of growth and 
the issue of who can, and should, bear the cost of new development.94 
1. Fees Versus Taxes 
One of the primary challenges local governments face when im-
posing impact fees on new development is that the charges are not in 
fact fees, but invalid taxes.95 Fees commonly share two characteristics 
with taxes: (1) they are levied by government on developers as a 
monetary charge and (2) they are often assessed on a proportional 
basis, using the number of units built, total floor area, or assessed 
value of the property.96 
growth-sensitive services); Arthur C. Nelson, Developmcnt Impact Fccs: The Next Gcncration, 26 
URB. LAW. 541, 543 (1994). 
87 Holloway & Guy, supra note 75, at 31. 
88 E.g., St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So.2d 635, 639 (Fla. 
1991). 
89 E.g., N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 388 (Ill. 
1995) (impact fee used to recoup costs of transportation improvements). 
90 E.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1984). 
91 Holloway & Guy, supra note 75, at 32. 
92 See 512 U.S. 374 (1994); discussion i1ifra Part II.A.3. 
93 See discussion infra Part 1I.A.3. 
94 See discussion i1lfra Part III. 
95 Sce Nelson, supra note 86, at 544. 
96 Scc supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. 
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Whether an impact fee is truly a fee or a tax is significant because 
local governments do not have an inherent authority to impose 
taxes.97 Rather, the authority to tax resides in state government.98 
Without a specific delegation of the taxing power by the state legisla-
ture, a local government exaction that has the functional characteris-
tics of a tax will be invalid.99 When determining whether a particular 
exaction is a valid fee or an invalid tax, courts assess whether the 
charge is related to an impact caused by those paying the fee,lOo and 
the degree to which the fee pays for a particular service used by fee 
payers, as opposed to a general public benefit. 101 
Valid fees, however, may be distinguished from taxes in several 
ways. Generally, it is said that fees are used to provide a direct benefit 
to the fee payer,I02 such as expanded school facilities to accommodate 
the children of residents in new development. Taxes, on the other 
hand, are characterized by an imposition of charges to be used for the 
benefit of the general public. lo3 This fee versus tax distinction attracts 
judicial scrutiny and presents a threshold challenge for impact fees. lo4 
For example, in a New Jersey case, Daniels v. BOTOllgh of Point 
Pleasant, the Borough amended an ordinance that imposed a fee for 
the issuance of building permits. 105 The original ordinance assessed a 
fee, based on a sliding scale proportionate to the value of the build-
ing, which was, in principle, used to pay the salary of the building in-
spector. I06 The Borough amended the ordinance by changing the as-
97 E.g., Collier County v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1014 (Fla. 1999); Daniels v. Borough of 
Point Pleasant, 129 A.2d 265, 266 (NJ. 1957). 
98 Collier COUllty, 733 So. 2d at 1014; Daniels, 129 A.2d at 269. 
99 Collier County, 733 So. 2d at 1014; Daniels, 129 A.2d at 269. 
100 Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) 
(holding that "local governments can shift to new residents the reasonable capital costs 
incurred on their account"). 
101 See Collier County, 733 So. 2d at 1017; N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du 
Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 394 (Ill. 1995); see also Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 611. The Hollywood 
Court noted: 
[Llocal goyernments can impose impact fees which do not exceed a pro rata 
share of the reasonably anticipated costs of capital expansion reasonably re-
quired because of the new development so long as the use of the money col-
lected is limited by law to meeting the costs of that capital expansion. 
431 So. 2d at 611. 
102 N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 394 (Ill. 1995). 
103 See id. 
104 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
105 Daniels, 129 A.2d at 265. 
106 [d. at 265-66. 
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sessment formula to one based on the square footage of any new con-
struction. I07 Since the amended ordinance significantly increased the 
amount of fees assessed, the plaintiff, a homebuilder, challenged it as 
a form of an illegal tax. IOS The plaintiff claimed that the purpose of 
the fee increase was to generate revenue to cover increasing school 
expenditures rather than offset increased inspection costs resulting 
from the new buildings. 109 
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that although local gov-
ernment may impose fees to recoup the costs of its police power regu-
lations and that this revenue may, to some extent, exceed the actual 
costs incurred, the fees at issue were assessed solely for the purpose of 
raising revenue. l1O They were not assessed for the services of the 
building inspector, but for general revenue to fund school costs.l11 
Although school impact fees have been upheld in several communi-
ties, the court in Daniels found that because the fee was originally es-
tablished for the purpose of defraying the costs of the building in-
spector, its amended use to generate school funds was in appro-
priate. 112 Even though the increased school funding needs were at-
tributable to new growth in the community, including the plaintiff's 
buildings, the actual costs of the building inspector's services re-
mained the same, while the fees increased to more than 700% of the 
actual cost of inspection services.ll3 The court stated that "[t]he phi-
losophy of this ordinance ... that the tax rate of the Borough should 
remain the same and the new people coming into the municipality 
should bear the burden of the increased costs of their presence" is 
"totally contrary to tax philosophy."114 The court considered the Bor-
ough's alternate use of the increased fees to be an invalid tax because 
it had no relation to the ostensible purpose ofthe original fee,1l5 
Similarly, in Collier County v. State, the Florida Supreme Court in-
validated a fee collected to offset a variety of basic municipal services 
because it provided no special benefit to the property owners paying 
the fees. 1I6 The County claimed a shortfall due to an existing tax law 
10; [d. at 266. 
108 [d. 
109 [d. 
110 [d. at 267-68. 
111 Daniels, 129 A.2d at 267. 
112 [d. at 267. 
113 [d. at 266-67. 
114 [d. at 267. 
115 See id. 
116 733 So. 2d 1012. 1017 (Fla. 1999). 
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which provided that taxes on new improvements could not be as-
sessed until the improvements were substantially completed.117 The 
County claimed that this tax structure meant that many new im-
provements substantially completed just after the end of the County's 
taxable year would place an increased burden on county services such 
as, code enforcement, animal control, libraries, parks, and public 
works, for the remainder of that year. At the same time, the County's 
regular ad valorem taxes would not be assessed until the end of that 
year. liS The fee was enacted to recover the costs of providing services 
during the period between the completion of developments and as-
sessment of the general property tax.1I9 
The test used by the court to differentiate between a fee and a 
tax was a two-part inquiry: (1) does the property paying the fee derive 
a "special benefit" from the service provided by the assessment?; and 
(2) was the fee "properly apportioned?"120 Because the services paid 
for with the fee were characteristic of the general services and func-
tions "'required for an organized society, "'121 the court held that the 
fee payers derived no special benefit and that the fee "ha[d] all the 
indicia of a tax. "122 In its holding, the court specifically noted that the 
first prong of the test is "not satisfied by establishing that the assess-
ment is rationally related to an increased demand for county 
services," but rather requires a narrower showing that the services 
funded by the fee provide a "direct, special benefit" to the fee pay-
ers.123 
By contrast, some courts have adopted a more liberal view to-
wards fees that resemble taxes. 124 In Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 
the court upheld an ordinance requiring either the dedication of 
land for parks or the payment of an in-lieu fee. 125 The ordinance in 
question gave developers the option of: (l) dedicating land according 
to a formula of three acres for everyone thousand new residents; (2) 
paying a fee equal to the value of the land that would have otherwise 
been dedicated; or (3) paying a fee according to a schedule in the 
117 Id. at 1015-16. 
llS Id. 
119Id. 
120 Id. at 1017. 
121 Id. (quoting Lake County v. Water Oaks Mgmt. Corp., 695 So. 2d. 667, 670 (Fla. 
1997)). 
122 Collier County, 733 So. 2d at 1017. 
123Id. 
m Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. Dis!. Ct. App. 1983). 
125 Id. at 613. 
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ordinance. 126 The court found that because this fee was assessed on 
the basis of population growth, rather than a fixed rate based on land 
area developed, it was sufficiently tailored to ensure that fee payers 
only pay for the amount of parkland required to provide adequate 
services to the new development. 127 
Like the court in Collier County, the Hollywood court used a two-
prong standard requiring that a valid fee be reasonably attributable to 
the new development and that fee proceeds be sufficiently earmarked 
for the substantial benefit of the new residents.128 In applying this test, 
however, the Hollywood court stated that the local government need 
only demonstrate a "reasonable connection, or rational nexus, be-
tween the need for additional capital facilities and the growth in 
population generated by the subdivision."129 Because Broward County 
showed that new parks would be required and that the fees collected 
would cover only a portion of the total costs to acquire additional 
parks, the court found that the first prong was satisfied.130 The court 
also discerned a reasonable connection between the expenditures of 
the funds and the benefits accruing to the subdivision, in part, be-
cause the ordinance incorporated the requirement of providing a 
"substantial benefit" into the language of the law, and further re-
quired that the new parks paid for by the fee be located within fifteen 
miles ofthe platted land. l3l The County supported the reasonableness 
of this distance by showing that residents travel relatively long dis-
tances to take advantage of county parks.132 The court considered this 
evidence sufficient in finding that the funds were adequately ear-
marked for the benefit of the new developments paying the fees,l33 
2. Authority and Due Process 
Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
local governments must act under state authority to impose impact 
fees. 134 This authority is usually grounded in one of the following 
126 [d. at 607-08. 
12; [d. at 610 (citing Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860, 861-64 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)). 
128 [d. at 611. 
129 [d. 
130 Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 612. 
131 [d. 
132 Jd. 
133 [d. 
134 U.S. CONST. amend. V; Nelson, supra note 86, at 543. The Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment is incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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bases. First, a local government may be granted explicit authority to 
assess impact fees by state enabling legislation.135 Enabling legislation 
authorizing localities to assess impact fees will often detail: (1) 
specific, growth-sensitive impacts for which a local government may 
establish fees; (2) the degree of precision required in assessing fees; 
and (3) the manner in which such fees may be spent. 136 Without ex-
plicit enabling legislation, some local governments may find similar 
authority in broad home rule powers, which often include the author-
ity to set fees and charges for the operation of local facilities. 137 Fi-
nally, many local governments rely on their inherent police powers to 
provide for the health, safety, and welfare of the public as a rationale 
for imposing impact fees. 138 If existing infrastructure, facilities, or 
services are maintained at the same levels and new development oc-
curs, local governments argue that the health, safety, and welfare of 
the public will be jeopardized.139 Many local governments have 
identified the impact fee as a method to exercise their regulatory 
authority to provide additional services and facilities. 140 This power 
has been successfully used as a justification for the extensive land use 
regulations employed by communities throughout the United States, 
from basic zoning to more controversial land use regulations, such as, 
real property dedications, monetary exactions, and impact fees. 141 
The ability of local government to use the police power to regu-
late land use and impose impact fees to protect its citizens from the 
impacts of growth, however, is not absolute. 142 In order to justifY an 
impact fee, government must provide more than a generalized state-
ment of the connection between the development and the exaction 
required. 143 The question then becomes: what growth-induced im-
Dolan v. City of Tigard. 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1994); Chicago B. & Q.R. CO. v. City of Chi-
cago, 166 U.S. 226,239 (1897). 
135 Nelson, supra note 86, at 543-44. 
136 See, e.g., CAPE COD COMM'N, MODEL IMPACT FEE BYLAW, available at http://www. 
capecodcommission.org/bylaws/impactfee.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2003). 
137 Nelson, supra note 86, at 544. 
138 [d.; see, e.g., Tidewater Ass'n of Homebuilders v. City of Virginia Beach, 400 S.E.2d 
523,525 (Va. 1991) (holding that the City's imposition of a water resource impact fee was a 
proper exercise of the police power and noting that a city "has the right and the duty to 
protect its water supply"). 
139 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 77, at 28. 
140 SeeJuergensmeyer, supra note 11, at 417; Nelson, supra note 86, at 54l. 
141 Sec Tidewater /I.SS'1/, 400 S.E.2d at 525. 
142 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987). 
143 [d. at 841 (expressing the majority's lack of confidence that the Commission could 
"have little difficulty in the future in utilizing its expertise to demonstrate a specific con-
nection between provisions for access and burdens on access" and holding that "the Fifth 
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pacts are sufficiently vital to the health, safety, and welfare of the pub-
lic to justify an impact fee? While real property and monetary exac-
tions have long been applied to a wide range of impacts, true fees 
have been more conservative in the services for which they are used 
to compensate. l44 
For decades, exactions were applied to provide open space and 
other public amenities.145 Fees, on the other hand, have been used to 
provide basic infrastructure. l46 One possible explanation for this dif-
ference is that traditional exactions necessarily relate to direct on-site 
impacts, whereas fees are appealing because they may be used to col-
lect money for off-site improvements.147 In charging for off-site im-
provements, as opposed to on-site, government may find the ability to 
justify the fee regulation as a protection of health, safety, and welfare 
somewhat more tenuous than in the context of traditional exac-
tions. 148 
The Hollywood court suggested that physical infrastructure, serv-
ices, and facilities are as essential to the public's health, safety, and 
welfare as sewers, roads, and schools. l49 As discussed earlier, the court 
in Hollywood upheld an ordinance requiring new development to 
dedicate real property or pay an in-lieu fee to provide for necessary 
park space in the community.l50 In its decision, the Hollywood court 
distinguished a Texas case where an exaction for recreational facilities 
was invalidated. l5l The Texas court in Berg DeveiojJ1nent Co. v. City of 
Missoll1i City held: 
While government can clearly require the dedication of wa-
termains and sewers as well as property for streets and alleys, 
we believe these to be distinguishable from the dedication of 
property for recreational purposes. The former bears a sub-
Amendment's Property Clause [is] more than a pleading requirement, and compliance 
with it to be more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination"). 
144 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 75, at 31; Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. Schoettle, A 
Survey of State Impact Fcc Enabling Legislation, in EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS: 
SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT AND FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE DOLAN ERA 63-
69 (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds .. Am. Bar Assoc. 1995). 
145 Sec Holloway & Guy, supra note 75, at 31. 
146 Leitner & Shoettle, supra note 144, at 63-69. 
147 SeeJuergensmeyer, supra note II, at 418. 
148 Sec Holloway & Guy, supra note 75, at 28. 
149 Sec Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983). 
150 Sec id. 
151 !d. at 613 (citing Berg Dev. Co. v. City of Missouri City, 603 S.W.2d 273. 275 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980)). 
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stantial relation to the safety and health of the community 
while the latter does not. 152 
In contrast, the Hollywood court held: 
Open space, green parks and adequate recreation areas are 
vital to a community's mental and physical well-being. As 
such, the ability to regulate subdivision development in or-
der to ensure the adequate provision of parks and recrea-
tional facilities is a matter that falls squarely within the state's 
police powers to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of 
the community.153 
As discussed in Part I.B.2 infra, the constitutional tests that have 
evolved to assess the validity of impact fees limit the exercise of the 
police power, when used to impose impact fees, to those impacts that 
truly threaten public health, safety, and welfare. Even when health, 
safety, and welfare are interpreted broadly enough to include a par-
ticular impact, a municipality is still required to establish a nexus be-
tween the development being regulated and the ostensible impact 
caused by it. 
3. Regulatory Takings 
The tension identified by the Florida court in Hollywood high-
lights another limitation of the police power. Even when local gov-
ernment claims authority for a regulation under the police power, the 
regulation may still be challenged if there is not a proper nexus be-
tween the harm being addressed and the regulation imposed,154 An 
impact fee that is imposed with proper authority, and is not an invalid 
tax, may still be viewed as a regulatory taking.155 
Impact fees are generally considered a form of exaction.156 They 
require a monetary payment or real property dedication as a condi-
tion on the use of private property,157 The power oflocal government 
to impose these regulations on private property is qualified by the 
152 Berg Dev. Co., 603 S.W.2d at 275. 
153 Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 614. 
154 See disclIssion infra Part I.B.2. 
155 See Shari Cruse, Imposition of Impact Fees After Volusia Coun ty v. Aberdeen: Has Florida 
Finally Reached its State and Federal Constitutional Limitr, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 269, 286 
(2001); Nelson, supra note 86, at 545. 
156 See discussion SIIpra Part I.B. 
157Id. 
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Takings Clause, which states that "private property [shall not] be 
taken for public use, without just compensation."158 This works as a 
limitation on the application of the police power to those land use 
regulations that are "reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a sub-
stan tial public purpose. "159 
There was no distinct federal, regulatory takings standard ap-
plied to exaction cases until the Supreme Court directly addressed 
exactions in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission in 1987, creating a 
standard that was later refined in Dolan v. City of Tigard in 1994.160 Be-
fore Nollall, courts analyzed most exactions challenges under existing 
takings precedent: employing the Penn Central balancing test,161 the 
two-pronged Agius test,162 or the per se test of Loretto v. TelepromjJter 
Manhattan CATV Corp.163 Although these various takings tests have 
been commented on extensively,164 a brief summary of background 
regulatory takings precedent is instructive. 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New Yorll, a New York 
City designation of Grand Central Station as a historic landmark lim-
ited the owner's ability to alter the structure.165 When the city denied 
an application to build an office building over the site, the owners 
sued, alleging a taking without just compensation.166 Balancing several 
factors, the Court found that the regulation did not go "too far" in its 
purpose of protecting historic structures.167 In determining when a 
government regulation goes too far, the Court balances the economic 
158 U.S. CONST. amend. V; scc Cruse, Sltpra note ISS, at 286. 
159 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978); scc Cruse, S1l-
pra note ISS, at 287. 
160 Matthew S. ''''atson, Note & Comment, Thc Scopc of tltc Suprc1l1e Court's Heightened 
Scrutiny Takings Doctrinc aud its I1I1pact 011 Developmcnt Exactions, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 181, 
194 (1998); scc Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). 
161 Pcnn Ccnt., 438 U.S. at 136-38 (determining the constitutionality of government 
regulation by balancing, among other factors, the legitimacy of the state objective, the 
magnitude of the financial impact on the regulated property owner, and the ll1\'estment-
backed expectations of the owner). 
162 Agins \'. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (zonlllg regulation effects a regu-
latory takmg if it does not advance a legitimate state mterest or denies the property owner 
economically viable use of his land); Watson, supra note 160, at 194. 
163 Loretto \'. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982) (hold-
ing that a governmentally mandated physical invasion of private property is a per se tak-
lllg). 
164 Scc, c.g., "'atson, supra note 160, at 194. 
165 438 U.S. at 109-12. 
166 Id. at 119. 
167 Scc id. at 138. 
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impact on the regulated party, in particular, its investment-backed ex-
pectations, against the character of the governmental action.168 In 
particular, the Court focuses on how much a regulation invades a par-
ticular property right. 169 
Although Penn Central is still a valid test for when a regulation 
goes too far, the Supreme Court supplemented its regulatory takings 
analysis with an apparently alternative test in A.gins v. City oj Tiburon.17° 
In Agius, the plaintiffs purchased property that a local zoning ordi-
nance subsequently restricted from intense development. l7l The 
Court, applying a two-prong test, found that the Tiburon ordinance 
did not effect a regulatory taking of the plaintiff's property. The 
Court stated that a regulatory taking would occur where the regula-
tion "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies 
an owner economically viable use of his land. "172 This test has been 
explained and refined in subsequent cases-the first prong in Nollall 
v. CalifoTl1ia Coastal Commission,173 and the second prong in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council and subsequent cases.174 
In Nollan, the plaintiffs applied for a required "coastal develop-
ment permit" from the California Coastal Commission in order to 
demolish a beachfront bungalow and replace it with a new house. 175 
The Commission recommended that the permit be granted on the 
condition that the Nollans provide a public easement for access across 
a portion of their property.176 The asserted purpose for the easement 
requirement was the Commission's desire to protect the public's abil-
ity to see the beach-"visual access"-and to prevent a "psychological 
barrier" to beach access. l77 The Nollans argued that the requirement 
was unconstitutional. 178 
The Supreme Court recognized that had the easement been re-
quired outright, rather than the subject of a permit condition, the 
168 Sec id. at 124,129-37. 
169 Id. at 130-31. 
1iO Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); sec Watson, supra note 160, at 
190. 
IiI Agins, 447 U.S. at 257. 
172 Id. at 260. 
173 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-36 (1987). 
174 Sec Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992) (discussing impor-
tance of "economically viable use" in regulatory takings analysis); Watson, supra note 131, 
at 191. 
175 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-28. 
176 Id. at 828. 
177 Id. 
178Id. at 829. 
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Commission's actions would clearly be an exercise of eminent do-
main, a physical occupation falling under the per se rule established 
in Loretto.179 Because the government demanded the easement as a 
condition of the permit, however, the Court viewed it as a land use 
regulation, recognizing that the Court has long held that a land use 
regulation "do[es] not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] a 
legitimate state interest' and does not 'den [y] an owner economically 
viable use of his land. "'180 Even so, the Court held that the easement 
condition constituted a regulatory taking. 181 
The Court agreed that, consistent with its broad interpretation of 
legitimate state interests, protecting beach access was likely a valid ex-
ercise of regulation and that the requirement of a permit to build on 
the beach, standing alone, would be \'alid.182 The Court, however, fo-
cused more closely on the connection between the interest being pro-
tected and the actual conditions imposed.183 Here, the Court found 
that the Commission's concern for "visual access" was not sufficiently 
related to the requirement of an easement.184 Particularly concerned 
by the government's ability to extort conditions from a permit appli-
cant, the Court required that the "permit condition serve[] the same 
governmental purpose as the development ban."185 The easement 
condition was, therefore, invalid because it sought to gain for the pub-
lic something different-direct access to the beach from the interest 
that gave rise to the condition-namely the Commission's concern 
with visual access. 186 
In Dolan, the Court reiterated the require men t of an "essen tial 
nexus" between the "'legitimate state interest' and the permit condi-
tion exacted"187 and expanded this analysis to include a requirement 
that the government's regulation be "roughly proportional" to the 
impact of the development. ISS In Dolan, the City of Tigard, Oregon, 
conditioned the grant of a building permit for the expansion of a 
hardware store and the paving of its adjacent parking lot on two re-
179 Id. at 831. 
180 Id. at 834 (quoting Agins Y. City of Tiburon. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980». 
181 Nollal/. 483 U.S. at 841-42. 
182 See id. at 834-35. 
183 Id. at 838-39. 
184 Id. 
185 /d. at 837. 
186 /d. at 837-39. 
18i Dolan Y. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994) (citing Nollall, 483 U.S. at 837). 
186 Id. at 386, 391. 
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quirements.189 First, the owner was required to dedicate to the city a 
strip of land within the lOO-year floodplain of a creek bordering the 
property.190 Second, the city planning commission required that she 
grant an easement across part of the property to be used as a pedes-
trian and bicycle path.191 The Court found that the City's interest in 
protecting the creek from increased storm-water runoff, due to the 
expansion of the store and pavement of the parking lot, was a legiti-
mate state interest.192 It also found that there was an essential nexus 
between the City's interests in protecting the creek from runoff and 
limiting development in the floodplain and the required land dedica-
tion.193 In addition, the Court found that "[iln theory, a pedes-
trian/bicycle pathway provides a useful alternative means of transpor-
tation for workers and shoppers. "194 Therefore, the interest in 
reducing potential traffic congestion due to the expansion was also 
valid. 195 
Although the Court agreed that there were essential nexuses be-
tween the development's impacts on water and traffic and the permit 
conditions, it did not find that the "degree of ... exactions demanded 
... [bore] the required relationship to the projected impact of [the 1 
... proposed development."196 In choosing a standard by which to 
evaluate this relationship, the Court examined a range of tests em-
ployed by state supreme courts in exaction cases.197 The Court noted 
that in some states, the only requirement is a "very generalized state-
ment[] ... as to the necessary connection between the required dedi-
cation and the proposed development."198 At the other end of the 
spectrum, some states demand a "very exacting correspondence" be-
tween the degree of the projected impact and the government's re-
quirements. l99 Under the latter "specific and uniquely attributable" 
189 Id. at 379-80. 
190 Id. at 380. 
191Id. 
192 Id. at 387. 
193 Down, 512 U.S. at 387-88. 
194Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 388 (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 839 (1987». 
197 See id. at 389-91. 
198 Id. at 389 (citing Billings Props., Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 
1964);Janad, Inc. v. ViII. of Scottsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966». 
199 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-90 (citing Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. ViII. of Mount Pros-
pect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961». 
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test, the exaction must be "directly proportional to the specifically 
created need" of the development, or it is invalid.20o 
Mter careful consideration, the Court found the generalized 
statement test "too lax"201 and the specifically and uniquely attribut-
able test more stringent than required by the Constitution.202 The 
Court instead followed a middle ground, crafted by several other state 
courts, requiring that there be a "reasonable relationship" between 
the required dedication and the impact of the proposed develop-
ment. 203 To reduce any confusion with the similarly-termed "rational 
basis" test employed in Equal Protection Clause cases, the Court 
termed this requirement one of "rough proportionality. "204 The Court 
further explained that although "[n]o precise mathematical calcula-
tion is required[,] ... the city must make some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature 
and extent to the impact of the proposed development."205 While re-
quiring more than a mere generalized link between the impact and 
the regulation, the Court did not choose a standard that requires an 
exact fit between the degree of regulation and the amount of im-
pact. 206 
What is evident after Nollan and Dolan, is that exactions will be 
subject to a heightened regulatory takings scrutiny and assessed by a 
two-part inquiry. First, there must be an essential nexus between the 
legitimate state interest being protected and the regulation;207 and 
second, the regulation must be roughly proportional to the projected 
impacts being addressed.208 However, in the context of impact fees, 
two key characteristics of Nollan and Dolan raise the question of 
whether this heightened scrutiny is applicable. First, in both cases, the 
exaction at issue was one requiring a real property dedication, rather 
than a fee. 209 Second, the permit conditions in these cases were de-
termined on an adjudicative basis, rather than by generally applicable 
ordinances, which represent legislative determinations.21o 
WOld. at 389-90. 
wild. at 389. 
202 ld. at 390. 
203 ld. at 390-91. 
2041d. at 391. 
205 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389. 
206 ld. at 391. 
207 ld. at 386. 
2081d. at 391. 
209 ld. at 380; NoHan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987). 
210 Dolall, 512 U.S. at 380; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828. 
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Several subsequent state cases and a number of scholars have 
questioned whether the heightened two-prong test articulated in Nol-
Ian and Dolan is applicable where the exaction at issue is a true impact 
fee-a monetary payment required under an ordinance passed by the 
legislative body.211 Underlying these issues in Nollan and Dolan are the 
extent to which the governmental requirement threatens a devel-
oper's property interests and which costs are properly borne by the 
public, rather than developers.212 
Some courts suggest that the two-prong test articulated in Nollan 
and Dolan applies to fees and property exactions alike.213 In Home-
builders Ass'n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, the Ohio 
Supreme Court addressed the validity of a fee assessed upon new de-
velopments in order to fund necessary roadway improvements.214 In 
finding that Nollan and Dolan applied to this fee ordinance, the court 
noted: 
Although impact fees do not threaten property rights to the 
same degree as land use exactions or zoning laws, there are 
similarities. Just as forced easements or zoning reclassifi-
cations can inhibit the desired use of property, an unreason-
able impact fee may affect the manner in which a parcel of 
land is developed.215 
By contrast, in McCarthy v. City of Leawood, the Supreme Court of 
Kansas suggested in dicta that a traffic impact fee would not be subject 
to Nollan/ Dolan scrutiny.216 The McCarthy court distinguished the 
traffic impact fee from the assessment invalidated by the Dolan Court 
based "on the required dedication of portions of Dolan's property to 
the city. "217 Because there was "no authority for the critical leap which 
211 Sce, e.g., Watson, supra note 160, at 202 (concluding that the Supreme Court's dis-
position and the California Court's decision in Ehrlich v. City of Culvel' City "strongly suggest 
the proposition that heightened scrutiny applies to monetary as well as physical exactions," 
but that the courts "distinguished adjudicatively imposed fees from those legislatively en-
acted"). 
212 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386-87; Nolian, 483 U.S. at 837. 
213 See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 
729 N.E.2d 349, 356 (Ohio 2000). 
214 See id. at 353. 
215 [d. at 355. 
216 See McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995). 
217 See id. at 846. 
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must be made from a fee to a taking," the McCarthy court stated that 
a fee was not subject to the Nollan/ Dolan test. 218 
One of the most notable cases to address the applicability of the 
Nollan/Dolan test to impact fees is Ehrlich v. City of Culver City.219 In Ehr-
lich, the City assessed two fees to a developer seeking to tear down his 
failed tennis facility and replace it with a condominium develop-
ment. 220 The City conditioned the developer's approval on his pay-
ment of $280,000, in lieu of constructing four tennis courts on the 
site, to help meet the City's recreational needs and on the payment of 
a fee under an "art in public spaces" ordinance.221 The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the California decision, 
remanding the case to the California Court of Appeal immediately 
following Dolan, for a determination consistent with its holding in that 
case.222 The appeals court split, and the case was decided by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court.223 
In Ehrlich, the court explicitly "reject[ed] the proposition that 
Nollan and Dolan are entirely without application to monetary exac-
tions," suggesting that the requirement of fees as opposed to real 
property does not itself protect the City from Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.224 
The court emphasized, however, the distinction between fees that are 
assessed "generally [or] ministerially" and those that are imposed "on 
218 See id.; see also Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 
1000 (Ariz. 1997) (distinguishing a water resource de\'elopment fee from the exaction in 
Dolan and holding that heightened scrutiny did not apply on the grounds that the City 
sought "to impose a fee, a considerably more benign form of regulation" than demand a 
real property dedication as in Dolan); Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 
692 (Colo. 2001) (distinguishing a "charge" to offset impacts of development from a 
"dedication of interest in real property" and holding that Nollan/Dolall does not apply to a 
sanitation plant impact fee). 
219 911 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996); see, e.g., Cruse, sujJra note 155, at 287-88; Jonathan 
Davidson et aI., "Wherc's Dolan roo; Exactions Law ill 1998, 30 URB. LAW. 683, 686 (1998). 
220 Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 434-35. 
221 !d. The art in public spaces ordinance required new residential development of 
more than four units as well as all commercial, industrial, and public buildings with a value 
over $500,000 to provide art work for the project in an amount equal to one percent of the 
total building value or pay an equal amount in cash to the city art fund. See id. at 435. 
222 Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994) (mem.). 
223 Ehrlich. 911 P.2d at 433. 
224 See id. at 444; see also Cruse, sUjJra note 155, at 288 (reading Ehrlich to mean that 
"Noll(/Il and Dolan not only apply to possessory dedication of real property, but also when 
local government seeks to exact a monetary fee as a condition of development permit 
issuance"). Some commentators suggest that the language in Nollan seems to limit the 
scope of its application to real property exactions. and indeed many lower courts have 
followed this view. Watson, sUjJra note 131, at 202; see, c.g., McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 
894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995). 
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an individual and discretionary basis," stating that Nollan/Dolan will 
apply to the latter.225 The court further pointed out that "[i] t is the 
imposition of land use conditions in individual cases, authorized by a 
permit scheme which by its nature allows for both the discretionary 
deployment of the police power and an enhanced potential for its 
abuse, that constitutes the sine qua non for application of ... Nollan 
and Dolan. "226 
The court applied the Nollan/Dolan standard to invalidate the ad 
hoc monetary recreation exaction, but refused to apply the height-
ened scrutiny to the ordinance-driven arts fee. 227 The California Su-
preme Court's decision in Ehrlich suggests that the application of the 
Nollan/Dolan test is not based on the fee versus property distinction, 
but on the need for higher scrutiny where the exaction is imposed 
adjudicatively rather than legislatively.228 Some courts have held that 
where an exaction takes the form of a generally applicable, ordi-
nance-driven, monetary requirement, that the heightened scrutiny of 
the Nollan/ Dolan standard does not apply.229 
B. The Nexus Requirements Applied in State Impact Fee Cases 
A look at how these tests play out in several states helps illustrate 
the variety of elements and interpretations based on the taxation, 
authority, and regulatory takings analyses described above. 
1. The Strict Taxation Test in Massachusetts: "Particularized Benefit" 
In addressing the validity of impact fees, Massachusetts applies a 
three-pronged standard based on the distinction between a tax and a 
fee. 230 The test was developed in 1983 in Emerson College v. City of Bos-
ton, and most recently applied in Greater Franklin Developers Ass'u v. 
225 Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 444. 
226 Id. at 439. 
227 See id. at 447,450. 
228 See id.; Davidson, supra note 219, at 686; Holloway & Guy. supra note 75, at 97-98. 
229 See Loyola Marymount Univ. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424, 434-35 
(Ct. App. 1996) (distinguishing Ehrlich on the grounds that the legislative nature of a re-
quired school development fee put it "within the general category of development fees" 
for which "the heightened scrutiny standards articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court in takings clause cases have no application"). 
230 Greater Franklin Developers Ass'n v. Town of Franklin, 730 N.E.2d 900, 902 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2000). 
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Town ofFranklin.231 It noted the factors that distinguish valid fees from 
invalid taxes: 
[1] they are charged in exchange for a particular govern-
mental service which benefits the party paying the fee in a 
manner "not shared by other members of society"; [2] they 
are paid by choice in that the party paying the fee has the 
option of not utilizing the governmental service and thereby 
avoiding the charge; [3] the charges are collected not to 
raise revenues, but to compensate the governmental entity 
providing the services for its expenses.232 
Applying this standard, the courts in Greater Franklin and Emerson Col-
lege held that fees assessed by the cities were invalid taxes despite their 
description as fees. 233 
In Emerson College, the court addressed a fee imposed by the City 
of Boston on Emerson College for "augmen ted fire services. "234 The 
City was authorized by state legislation to impose a charge against 
owners of buildings that, because of size, construction, and other fac-
tors, required the City to "employ additional firefighters, deployaddi-
tional equipment and purchase equipment different in kind from 
that required to provide fire protection for the majority of struc-
tures. "235 After explaining the standard discussed above, the court fo-
cused on the first prong.236 
It emphasized that fees charged to a limited group of individuals 
are legitimate where the services provided by the fees are "sufficiently 
particularized. "237 The court was concerned with the fact that the fee 
would not only be used to provide resources necessary to protect 
those structures owned by payers of the fee, "but also the personnel 
and equipment necessary to safeguard the building'S occupants and 
to prevent the spread of fire to adjacent buildings. "238 Because the 
calculation of the fee included the costs of these additional services, 
the benefits of the fee were not limited to owners of the charged 
buildings, and this finding led the court to hold that the fee was an 
231Id. (citing Emerson Coli. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Mass. 1984». 
232Id. at 902 (quoting Emcrson Coli., 462 N.E.2d at 1105) (brackets in original). 
233 SceEmersoll Coil., 462 N.E.2d at 1106-07; GrcatcrFrallklin, 730 N.E.2d at 901-04. 
234 Emcrson Coil., 462 N.E.2d at 1100. 
235Id. 
236 Id. at 1104-07. 
237 Id. at 1106. 
238Id. 
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invalid tax.239 The court also examined the third prong of the stan-
dard, expressing some concern that the cost of fire protection was 
traditionally included in the property tax assessment, as a public serv-
ice paid for by general revenues, and in this case was being applied as 
a special service.240 
Greater Franklin involved a town ordinance that imposed a school 
impact fee to '''ensure[] that development bears a proportionate 
share of the cost of capital facilities necessary to accommodate snch 
development and to promote and protect the public health, safety 
and welfare."'241 The court found that the benefit provided by ex-
panded school facilities was not particularized to the fee payers.242 
The court noted that the fees, earmarked for capital improve men ts, 
could be used to build a new cafeteria in which students living in 
older homes not paying the fee would be allowed to eat. 243 Because 
the fee did not "benefit the fee payer in a manner not shared by oth-
ers," the court held it was better characterized as a taX.244 To support 
its argument, the Town of Franklin cited St. Johns v. Northeast Florida 
Builders Ass 'n, in which the Florida Supreme Court found that under 
the benefits prong of its dual nexus standard, it was not required that 
every household paying the fee have a child benefiting from the 
school facilities. 245 However, the court in Greater Franklin distinguished 
Northeast Flmida Builders, pointing out that the test in that case "re-
quires only that the town satisfy a 'rational nexus,'" and emphasized 
the heightened level of scrutiny of its own standard.246 
As in EmeTSon College, the court in Greater Franklin was also suspi-
cious of the use of the fee as a "guise" for raising revenue for services 
that are public in nature, a concern addressed by the third prong of 
the Emerson College standard.247 Borrowing language from a similar 
New Jersey case, the court noted that '" [t] he philosophy of this ordi-
nance is that the tax rate ... should remain the same and the new 
239Id. at 1105-06. 
240 See Emerson Call., 462 N.E.2d at 1107. 
241 Id. at 901 (quoting Franklin By-Law § 83-2(2) (1995». 
242 Id. at 902. 
243 !d. 
244 Id. at 903. 
245 Id. (citing St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So.2d 635, 639 
(Fla. 1991». 
246 Greater Franklin, 730 N.E.2d at 902 (quoting Northeast Fla. Builders, 583 So.2d at 
637). 
247Id. (citing Emerson ColI. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1102 (Mass. 1984); 
Daniels v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 129 A.2d 265, 267 (N J. 1952». 
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people coming into the municipality should bear the ... increased 
cost of their presence.'"248 The Greater Franklin court agreed with the 
New Jersey court that this approach was contrary to tax policy and an 
invalid use ofthe fee. 249 
2. Florida Reaffirms a Strict Standard: Volusia County v. Aberdeen at 
Ormond Beach, L.P. 
The Florida Supreme Court revisited school impact fees in May 
2000 in Volusia County v. Aberdeen at 01'1nond Beach, L.P'250 In Abenieen, 
the owners of a mobile home park with restrictive covenants prohibit-
ing children from living there, challenged a school impact fee as ap-
plied to their property.251 The court cited its continued application of 
the dual nexus standard developed in Hollywood, Inc. v. Bl'Owani County 
in 1983.252 The standard requires that there be a "reasonable connec-
tion between (1) 'the need for additional facilities and growth in pop-
ulation generated by the subdivision' and (2) 'the expenditures of 
funds and benefits accruing to the subdivision.'"253 The court rein-
forced that fees must "be spent to benefit those who have paid the 
fees, "254 and that in that case it invalidated the fee "because it did not 
provide a unique benefit to those paying."255 Relying on dicta in 
Northeast FI01ida Builders, Volusia County argued that, in applying the 
dual nexus test, the court was bound to assess needs and benefits 
based on coun tywide growth.256 
The court, however, stated that the test in Florida was based not 
on countywide growth, but rather on the needs created by, and 
benefits accruing to, a specific subdivision or fee payer.257 Allowing 
countywide growth demands to satisfY the fee nexus would "eviscerate 
248Id. (quoting Danicls, 129 A.2d at 267). 
249 Id. 
250 Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 128 (Fla. 2000) 
(decided just over a month before the Massachusetts Appeals Court's decision in Greatcr 
Franklin). 
251Id. 
252 Scc id. at 134-35. The Hollywood standard had been affirmed in St. Jolms County v. 
Northcast Flolida Builders Ass'n in 1991 and Collicr County v. State in 1999. Sce id. 
253 Id. at 134 (quoting St. Johns Countyv. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 
637 (Fla. 1991) (quoting Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 611-12 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1983»). 
254 Id. (quoting St. Johns Coun ty v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass 'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 639 
(Fla. 1991». 
255Id. (quoting Collier County v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1019 (Fla. 1999». 
256 Scc Aberdecll, 760 So. 2d at 134. 
257 Scc id. at 134. 
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the substantial nexus requirement. "258 It is this nexus requiring fees to 
"confer a special benefit on feepayers 'in a manner not shared by 
those not paying the fee,'" the court stated, that distinguishes fees 
from invalid taxes. 259 
Applying the nexus test in Aberdeen, the court held that the school 
impact fee was invalid as applied to the age-restricted mobile home 
park.26o The fee violated the first prong of the test because the court 
could not find any evidence that the homes would create a specific 
need for additional school facilities. 261 Although Volusia County ar-
gued that there was a possibility that an adult in the park could attend 
school in some capacity, the court agreed with the trial court's conclu-
sion that the rational nexus requires "more than a possible or inci-
dental impact on the need for schools."262 With regard to the second 
prong, the court also found no nexus between the expenditure of fees 
and specific benefits to the fee payers.263 Because no children could 
live at the park, the fees would not be spent for their benefit, but 
rather for the benefit of children in other developments.264 The 
County also argued that the schools provided a benefit to the resi-
dents of the park as emergency shelters.265 However, the court found 
that the "tangential benefit of having places of refuge in natural disas-
ters ... [was] too attenuated to demonstrate a substantial nexus."266 
Because the park neither contributed to the need for schools, nor 
benefited from their construction, the court held the fee invalid as 
applied. 267 
The strict nexus test, requiring a specific need rather than a 
countywide need, was also applied by the Illinois Supreme Court in 
Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n v. County of DIt Page. 268 The court 
applied the Nollan/Dolan test, but under the stricter "uniquely attrib-
utable" standard, the court held that a fee for services made necessary 
by the "'total activity of the community'" would be invalid.269 Similarly, 
258Id. at 135. 
259Id. (quoting Collier County v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1019 (Fla. 1999)). 
260 Id. at 136-37. 
261 Id. at 136. 
262 Aberdeen, 760 So. 2d at 136 (quoting the trial court's decision). 
263 Id. at 136. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. 
266Id. 
267Id. 
268 649 N .E.2d 384, 389-90 (III. 1995). 
269Id. (quoting Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 
802 (III. 1961) (quoting Rosen v. Vill. of Downers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230, 234 (III. 1960))). 
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the court held that the fee in that case failed the second prong be-
cause the funds could be used for areas outside the district in which 
the fees were collected.270 
3. More Liberal Readings of the Nexus Requirements 
Several states apply standards with elements similar to those in 
the strict taxation tests and Dolall,..based regulatory takings standards. 
However, in a number of these states, courts have allowed a more lib-
eral application of the nexus requirements, in particular, loosening 
the requirement that the fees be used to provide direct benefits to 
those paying them. For example, in Home Builders Ass'n of Centml A1i-
zona v. City of Scottsdale, the Supreme Court of Arizona addressed the 
use of impact fees to pay for future water needs.271 In that case, the 
City imposed on new developments a water resources fee to pay for 
additional water supplies necessitated by the area's unsustainable use 
of existing supplies.272 The trial court read into the enabling statute a 
requirement that the fee provide a direct benefit to the developers.273 
In reversing the trial court's decision, the Arizona Supreme Court 
noted that the statute specifically refrained from requiring a direct 
benefit.274 It stated that such a requirement 
would be incompatible with the nature of the development 
fee .... Development or impact fees are designed to assist in 
raising the capital necessary to meet needs that surely will 
arise in the foreseeable future but whose precise details may 
not at the outset be quite clear. To require more fixed and 
certain plans would make it difficult, if not impossible, to 
prepare in advance for the consequences of continued 
growth.275 
The court did, however, find that the statute requires the fee to result 
in some benefit to the developer.276 
Although it determined that Dolan was inapplicable as a test for 
the fee, the court applied a dual-nexus test derived from "state cases 
[that] have produced a widely accepted standard for assessing the va-
270 Id. at 390. 
271 930 P.2d 993, 997, 998 (Ariz. 1997). 
272 Id. at 994. 
2731d. at 996-97. 
274 ld. at 997. 
2751d. 
2761d. 
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lidity of these fees. "277 The Arizona court adopted a dual-nexus stan-
dard that required: (1) a factual relationship between the fee and the 
need created by the development and (2) a reasonable relationship 
between the nature and extent of the fee and the portion of the pub-
lic burden created by the development. 278 The court found that the 
legislature adopted the water fee statute in light of this case law and 
held that the benefit standard only requires that the fee "bear a rea-
sonable relationship 'to the community burden."'279 
Applying the dual-nexus requirements, other states have also al-
lowed a more flexible approach to the benefit criterion. New Jersey, 
for example, has applied a test "'grounded on considerations of fun-
damental fairness and constitutional doctrine. "'280 The test requires 
that services provided by a fee be a "direct consequence of the devel-
opment"281 and that there be a nexus between the cost of services and 
benefits conferred on the subdivision.282 When applying this standard, 
however, the court has recognized that "land-use principles cannot be 
applied with exactitude" and that these prongs require a rational 
nexus, not a mathematical certainty.283 The court in F & W Associates 
v. County of Somerset emphasized that this standard was intended to en-
sure that developers did not pay a disproportionate share of the cost 
of improvements that benefit the general public. The mere presence 
of benefits for the general public, however, would not necessarily in-
validate the fee. 284 
III. THE UTILITY OF IMPACT FEES FOR GROWTH MANAGEMENT 
A. What Can Fees Internalize? State Tests Generally 
Consideration of impact fees over the past several decades has 
developed a robust and somewhat inconsistent body of case law. The 
277 Horne Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz., 930 P.2d at 997,999-1000. 
278Id. at 997. 
279 Id. at 998 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.05 (West 2002». 
280 F & W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 648 A.2d 482, 487 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Dh·. 
1994) (quoting Vrabel v. Mayor of Sayerville, 601 A.2d 229, 233 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1992». 
281 Id. (quoting Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 287 
(NJ.1990». 
282Id. 
283 /d. ("For example, the assessment should not be invalidated simply because there 
may be a residual benefit conferred to the general public in its use of the off-tract road 
improvemen ts."). 
284 Id. at 487. 
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doctrine that emerges from the existing state and federal cases illus-
trates the primary legal challenges faced by impact fees: (1) lack of 
authority; (2) illegal tax; and (3) uncompensated, regulatory tak-
ings.285 Where the Nollan/ Dolan analysis is applied, the test requires a 
nexus between the impact and the fee demanded, and a rough pro-
portionality between the fee and the impact.286 In a regulatory takings 
analysis, if the Nollan/Dolan test is inapplicable, the deferential Agins 
standard applies and most exactions would pass constitutional mus-
ter.287 However, as in the state cases discussed earlier, even where the 
Nollan/Dolan test is not applied, most state courts supplement their 
traditional analysis with a test based on the principles articulated in 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard: es-
sential nexus and rough proportionality.288 
Although the various state tests used to assess the validity of im-
pact fees often share almost identical elements, their application is far 
from uniform. The individual state's interpretation of the nexus re-
quirements, and the degree of exactitude they require, has a pro-
found affect on the range of impacts that are recoverable through 
impact fee ordinances.289 The needs and benefits tests often applied 
in impact fee jurisprudence reflect the nexus and proportionality 
elements of the combined Nollan/Dolan test, but with subtle and im-
portant differences.29o 
1. The Nollan or "Needs" Prong 
Nollan and Dolan articulate a two-pronged standard that requires 
an exaction to be related in purpose to the harm it is said to address, 
as well as be proportional to that harm.291 The first prong of the Nol-
lan/Dolan analysis focuses on the essen tial nexus between the impact 
and the exaction-for example, between the building of a parking lot 
and the exaction of land to provide a buffer for the increased run-
off.292 States that employ a needs prong similar to a Nollan analysis, 
285 See discussion supra Part II.A.l-.3. 
286 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); NoHan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
287 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Erhlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 447 (Cal. 
1996); discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
286 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
289 See id. 
290 See id. 
291 See Dolall, 512 U.S. at 391; Nollall, 483 U.S. at 837. 
292 See Nollall, 483 U.S. at 837. 
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require the entity bearing the burden of an exaction to have created 
some need for the exaction.293 
The court's approach to school fees in Volusia County v. Aberdeen 
at Ormond Beach, L.P. represents perhaps the strictest application of 
the needs prong.294 There the court held that the test was not met in 
the case of a mobile home park that did not allow child residents, be-
cause a fee was unnecessary to recover costs of children residing in 
the park attending local schools.295 There, the County's argument that 
the development was part of a countywide growth boom, which neces-
sitated additional school facilities, failed because the court still re-
quired that a particular development create a specific need.296 It was 
possible, therefore, to distinguish the school issue from other impacts 
because, on the particular facts of llberdeen, there was only a remote 
possibility that the school would be burdened by additional students 
from the plaintiff's development. 297 The main issue, then, was 
whether the generalized impact of countywide growth to which the 
development contributed could be the basis for satisfYing the needs 
prong, and the court held that it could not.298 
Thus, under the Aberdeen interpretation of the needs prong, 
there must be more than a minor impact caused by the develop-
ment. 299 This merely reaffirms, however, the established nexus test 
from Nollan; the fee must seek to recoup costs to provide for a need 
that the development played a role in creating.30o In fact, as long as 
there is something more than a "possible or incidental impact," most 
courts appear to find a nexus sufficient to satisfy the first prong analy-
sis.30 ! The Florida Supreme Court made this clear in its earlier deci-
sion in St. Johns County v. Northeast FLO/ida Builders Ass 'n, finding that 
the school impact fee there did meet the first prong.302 The distinc-
tion between Aberdeen and Northeast FLO/ida Builders is that, in the latter, 
at least some of the new units in the subdivision might over time 
293 See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
294 See 760 So. 2d 126, 134-35 (Fla. 2000). 
295 [d. at 136. 
296 See id. at 135. 
297 See id. at 136. 
298 See id. at 135-36. 
299 See id. at 134-35. 
300 See NoHan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); discussion supra 
Part II. 
301 Aberdeen. 760 So. 2d at 136; See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City. 911 P.2d 429, 448 (Cal. 
1996); F & W Assocs. v. County of Somerset. 648 A.2d 482. 487 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1994). 
302 583 So. 2d 635, 638-39 (Fla. 1991). 
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house school-aged children, who would require the county to provide 
the needed increased school capacity.303 
In Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass 'n v. County of Du Page, an Illi-
nois court pointed out that impact fees are valid in order to fund serv-
ices that are required by a developer's activity, but that fees are an in-
valid mechanism for funding needs created by the "total activity of the 
community. "304 This approach highlights a fundamental challenge in 
evaluating impact fees imposed by rapidly growing communities: the 
line between a developer's impacts and those of the community as a 
whole is rarely clear. One of the defining characteristics of sprawl is 
that the aggregate impact of many individual activities produces a 
profound effect on the needs of the community as a whole.305 Moreo-
ver, where a previously undeveloped area experiences rapid growth, it 
may be difficult to distinguish the impacts of individual development 
from a prevailing pattern of growth that defines the entire commu-
nity. 
2. The Dolan or "Benefits" Prong 
Although the needs prong is generally deferential, so long as the 
fee seeks to address a legitimate governmental interest, the benefits 
prong is where most impact fees fai1. 306 Again, like the needs or Nollan 
prong, the benefit prong employed by many states closely parallels the 
test laid out by the Supreme Court in Dolan.307 Under Dolan an exac-
tion must be roughly proportional to the projected impact of the de-
velopment.308 The underlying premise is that if the exaction is pro-
portionate to the impact, then the landowner is protected from 
paying more than his fair share of the costS.309 If the landowner pays 
only his share, then he is not being unfairly required to bear a private 
burden for the benefit of the general public.310 Thus, the benefit-side 
approach used by some states and Dolan's rough proportionality re-
quirement both appeal to concepts of fundamental fairness. 
303 See id. at 638. 
304 See 649 N.E.2d 384, 390 (Ill. 1995). 
305 See discussion supra Part lB. 
306 See discussion supra Part IlA.3. 
307Id. 
308 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); discussion supra Part I.B. 
309 See F & W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 648 A.2d 482, 487 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. 
Div.1994). 
310 See id. 
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However, the two approaches do not necessarily lead to identical 
analyses or results. Under a Dolan rough proportionality analysis, a fee 
is valid where the amount charged reasonably corresponds to the im-
pacts from the development it seeks to address.311 In contrast, in a 
benefit-side approach, courts are concerned not only with how much 
benefit is being extracted by the fee, but also to whom that benefit is 
being provided.312 It is at this point that the distinction between taxes 
and fees influences the analysis. Although Dolan does not address who 
benefits from a proportionate exaction, courts applying the benefits 
test to distinguish a fee from an invalid tax look to whether the 
benefit is provided to the payer of the fee rather than to the general 
public.313 This portion of the inquiry derives from the state taxation 
tests, not from Dolan.314 In a pure Dolan regulatory takings analysis, 
the benefit issue does not affect the rough proportionality prong.315 
In evaluating impact fees, most states, however, either apply a distinct 
taxation test, which does consider who benefits, or the aggregate, two-
prong needs-benefit test, which incorporates elements of both the 
Nollan/Dolan and taxation tests.316 As the Supreme Court discussed in 
Dolan, states applying these tests have a history of wide-ranging inter-
pretations of the proportionality or nexus required to establish a valid 
exaction.317 
In addressing the taxation issue, distinct from the regulatory tak-
ings issue, Massachusetts cases are among the strictest applications of 
the benefit analysis.318 The restrictive precedent established in Emerson 
College v. City of Boston suggests that a fee will not be valid in Massachu-
setts so long as it provides any possibility of a benefit running to those 
not paying the fee. 319 Using language that appears in impact fee cases 
from other states, the Massachusetts courts demand that a fee provide 
a benefit "particularized" to the fee payers and "not shared by other 
311 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
312 See, e.g., Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 131, 
135-36 (Fla. 2000); F & WA.ssocs., 648 A.2d at 487. 
313 See ll.berdeen, 760 So. 2d at 135. 
314 See discussion supra Part II.A.l. 
315 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 286 (demonstrating that the two tests are separate and distinct). 
316 Compare Greater Franklin Developers Ass'n v. Town of Franklin, 730 N.E.2d 900, 
901-02 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (applying an impact fee test based on the taxation limita-
tions), with Aberdeen, 760 So. 2d at 131, 135 (applying a two-pronged standard based on 
need and benefi ts related to the Nollan and Dolan analyses). 
317 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-91. 
318 See id. at 391. 
319 See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
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members of society. "320 Applying this standard to the fire protection 
and school fees in Emers01l and Greater Fmnklin Developers Ass 'n v. Town 
of Franklin respectively, the court took a literal approach and invali-
dated both fees because of the possibility of a benefit accruing to 
general public.321 
The Florida Supreme Court used almost identical language in its 
impact fee cases that invalidated two different school fees and a gen-
eral services fee. 322 The fee in Collier County v. State was to be used for a 
variety of services identified by the county as "growth-sensitive. "323 The 
court invalidated the fee, in part, because the county provided no evi-
dence of a rational relation between the need for services and the 
new development, but also because the fees would provide no direct 
benefit to those paying the fee that would not be shared by others.324 
The court in Collier County seemed particularly concerned by the gen-
eral and public nature of the services for which the fee was un-
posed.325 
Because the services that are required by increased growth are 
often the same as, or similar to, those that are thought of as public 
rather than private services, courts may be reluctant to allow fees to 
fund them, particularly in states following a strict benefit approach. 
Along these lines, the court in Northeast Florida Builders reached a simi-
lar result as the Massachusetts court in Greater Fmnklin.326 The court in 
Nm·theast Flmida Builders found that non-paying residents might send 
children to schools funded by the fee, and that no fee could be im-
posed for school funding until "substantially all of the population" in 
the county was subjected to paying it.327 In Aberdeen, the court reiter-
320 Emerson Coli. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Mass. 1984) (quoting Nat'l 
Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974»; Greater Franklin, 730 
N.E.2d at 902; discussion supra Part II.B.l. 
321 See discussion supra II.B.l. 
322 SeeVolusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 136-37 (Fla. 
2000); Collier County v. State, 733 So.2d 1012, 1019 (Fla. 1999); St. Johns County v. 
Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 639 (Fla. 1991). 
323 Collier COU1Ity, 733 So. 2d at 1015-16. The fee funded certain "growth sensitiveft serv-
ices, including: the office of the sheriff, elections, code enforcement, courts and related 
agencies, animal control, libraries, parks and recreation, public health, medical examiner, 
public works, and support services. Id. 
324 See id. at 1018-19. 
325 See id. 
326 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
327 Northeast Fla. Builders, 583 So. 2d at 639. However, the court is not concerned that 
some of those paying the fee will not directly benefit from it-by not sending their chil-
dren to the school for which they theoretically paid. In fact, the court suggests that this 
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ated that the substantial nexus element of the benefit prong requires 
that a fee provide a benefit to the payers that is not shared by others, 
otherwise the fee will be struck down as an invalid tax.328 
The "specific and uniquely attributable" test applied in Northern 
Illinois Home Builders v. County of DIl Page, is another limiting variation 
of the benefit prong, but one that is potentially less restrictive than 
the Massachusetts "particularized benefit" test.329 In order to satisfY 
the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test, the town can only: (1) 
'''impose impact fees for the road improvements made necessary by 
the additional traffic generated by new development ... "'; and (2) 
"'the new development paying the impact fee must receive a direct and 
material benefit from the improvement financed by the impact fee,'''33o 
Thus, the specific and uniquely attributable test requires a precise 
proportionality, and requires that the fee be spent to provide im-
provements that are sure to benefit the payers, but does not seem to 
be violated if others may also benefit. On the other hand, fees cannot 
be used to provide any benefits that will not be enjoyed by the fee 
payers. In Northern Illinois Home Builders, the court upheld an ordi-
nance that ensured fee funds would be spent on road improvements 
within the payer's district, but unlike in Emerson, Franklin, or the Flor-
ida cases, the possibility or even likelihood of other members of the 
public receiving some benefit-here the roads in the payer's district-
did not render the fee invalid.331 
Other states also allow the general public to derive some subsidi-
ary benefit from the services provided by fee proceeds, so long as 
some benefit is provided to the fee payers.332 How much benefit, or 
how direct or material it must be, does vary. With respect to the pro-
portionality question, most states recognize, as in Dolan, that mathe-
matical precision is not feasible nor required, so long as the fee is 
would be acceptable. Rather, the court is concerned that there is no guarantee the fee 
funds will be used to provide allY benefit whatsoever to allY of the fee payers. See id. 
328 See 1l.beTdecn, 760 So. 2d at 135. 
329 See discussion N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 
389-90 (Ill. 1995); see also Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Viii. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 
799,802 (Ill. 1961) (establishing the rule that exactions are permissible where the devel-
oper is required to provide improvements necessitated by his own facility, but are not per-
missible for improvements made necessary by "the total activity of the community"). 
330 N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 390 (Ill. 1995) 
(quoting N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 621 N.E.2d 1012, 1019-20 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1993». 
331 See discussion supra Part n.B. 
332 See id. 
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roughly proportional to the impact.333 In F & W Associates v. County of 
Somerset, the New Jersey court acknowledged that fee payers should 
not pay for a disproportionate share of benefits that may be enjoyed 
by the general public, while acknowledging that this proportionality 
cannot be precisely computed.334 As the Northern Illinois Home Builders 
court implied, the court in F & W Associates stated explicitly that a fee 
"should not be invalidated simply because there may be a residual 
benefit conferred to the general public in its use of the off-tract road 
improvement. "335 The F & W Associates and Northern Illinois Home 
Builders approaches are clearly more lenient than the tests used by the 
Massachusetts and Florida courts. In both cases, however, the service 
provided by the fee was primarily for the benefit of the fee payers, and 
the courts were willing to tolerate some "residual benefit," or inciden-
tal use, by the general public.336 
Surprisingly, this does not necessarily guarantee similar treatment 
of more general services, such as those addressed in Collier County. If 
the New Jersey or Illinois courts were faced with a fee to fund animal 
control, the sheriff's office, or other growth-sensitive services, it is un-
clear whether these would be upheld as providing a benefit to the fee 
payers, regardless of a "residual benefit" to non-payers, or if it would 
be invalid as a wholly public benefit-the cost of which falls dispro-
portionatelyon the new development. 
Although the middle path of rough proportionality chosen by 
the United States Supreme Court in Dolan is considered a heightened 
standard when compared with the highly deferential Agins, Penn Cen-
tral, and Loretto tests,337 it is still substantially more deferential than the 
strict taxation tests. 338 So long as fee proceeds are earmarked for a 
specific purpose, kept in a separate account, and spent on the thing 
that is reasonably related to the impact concerned, courts applying 
the Dolan standard will generally uphold the fee. 339 However, the Do-
lan standard represents only the regulatory takings component of the 
impact fee tests applied in several states. When Dolan is merged with 
the strict taxation standard, used to distinguish fees from taxes, the 
333 F & W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 648 A.2d 482, 487 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1994). 
334 !d. 
335 Id.; see N. Ill. Home BuildeTS, 649 N .E.2d at 390. 
336 F & W,4.ssocs., 648 N.E.2d at 487; see N. Ill. Home BuildcTS, 649 N.E.2d at 390. 
337 See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
338 See Dolan Y. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Emerson ColI. y. City of Bos-
ton, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Mass. 1984); Nelson, supra note 86, at 547-48. 
339 See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
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benefits prong is more restrictive.340 As applied in Massachusetts and 
Florida, the benefi ts prong restricts the use of impact fees to services 
that provide an exclusive benefit to those paying the fee, and effec-
tively precludes all but the most basic growth-sensitive services.341 
Most services that provide tangential benefits to the general public 
would require, as suggested by the court in NOTtheast FlO1ida Builders, a 
fee to be applied county-wide, thus defeating the purpose of a devel-
opment-specific fee.342 
Similarly, in a state following Illinois' "specifically and uniquely 
attributable" approach, the use of impact fees to address growth 
might also be severely limited.343 Indeed, if fees are established to ad-
dress impacts of growth, then they will target impacts common to 
many developments that, in the aggregate, impose costs on the com-
munity. To insist that those impacts be uniquely attributable to an in-
dividual development may be logically inconsistent with the nature of 
sprawl-namely that it is the collective force of numerous develop-
ments that effects an external cost on society.344 
B. Specific Costs 
Although the validity of impact fees will depend primarily on the 
standard applied in the particular state, some generalizations can be 
made about the legal challenges faced by certain types of impact fees. 
Differen t levels of scrutiny employed by state courts may affect the use 
of impact fees to address the different types of growth impacts. 
1. Direct Infrastructure Costs: Sewers and Roads 
The best candidates for successful impact fees are those that ad-
dress the impacts of deyelopment on basic infrastructure and sery-
ices.345 New developments require the provision and expansion of es-
sential capital facilities, such as roads and wastewater treatment, which 
are necessary to prevent the new growth from creating detrimental 
340 Sec id. 
341 Sec, e.g., Collier County v. State, 733 So.2d 1012, 1015-16 (Fla. 1999); Emerson 
ColI. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Mass. 1984). 
342 Sec St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So.2d 635, 639 (Fla. 
1991). 
343 See N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 390 (Ill. 
1995); Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N .E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 
1961). 
344 Sec discussion supra Part I. 
345 Sec discussion supra Part II.B. 
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impacts on public health, safety, and welfare. Charges for road im-
provements are a common target for impact fees. 346 Generally, these 
are successful when some attempt is made to calculate the propor-
tionate share attributable to each new development and where the 
fees are earmarked for specific road projects in or around the new 
development. 
Thus, in F & W Associates v. County of Somerset, the court upheld 
the imposition of charges for off-tract road improvements, finding 
that they satisfied the required rational nexuses, largely because the 
ordinance included a formula for calculating each development's pro-
rata share.347 Similarly, in Northem, Illinois Home Builders Ass'n v. County 
of Du Page, the court upheld a traffic fee ordinance because it con-
tained explicit language to ensure that funds were spent in the district 
in which the fees were collected, whereas it invalidated an earlier ver-
sion of the ordinance, which did not have similar safeguards.348 Even 
where fees are used on a larger scale than merely to build the roads 
immediately adjacent to a new development, such as constructing a 
"new transportation infrastructure ... to meet increased traffic 
needs," courts may uphold the fees.349 Applying the Nollan/Dolan test, 
the court in Home Builders of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of 
Beavercreek upheld a transportation fee, as the court did in F & W Asso-
ciates, and Northern Illinois, because the defendant showed that it had 
done an analysis of the required road facilities in each of several 
transportation districts, and applied a methodology for allocating 
those costs to new developments.35o 
A similar fee, however, was invalidated by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in Country Joe, Inc. v. City of Eagan.351 In Country Joe, the court 
focused on the tax/fee distinction and held that the alleged fee was in 
reality a revenue-raising measure and, thus, making it an illegal tax.352 
Like the fees in Home Builders of Dayton, the fees in Country Joe were to 
be used to improve the general transportation infrastructure.353 Un-
like the facts in Home Builders of Dayton, however, the funds were col-
346 See, e.g., N. Ill. Home Builders, 649 N.E.2d at 388; F & W. Assocs., 648 A2d at 484. 
347 See F & W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 648 A2d 482, 487 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. 
Diy. 1994). 
348 See N. Ill. Home Builders, 649 N.E.2d at 389-90. 
349 Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 
N.E.2d 349, 356-58 (Ohio 2000). 
350 See id. at 356-57. 
351 Country Joe, Inc. y. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681, 686-87 (Minn. 1997). 
352 See id. at 686. 
353 See id. at 682. 
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lected from all new developmen t in the city and placed in a general 
road improvement fund. 354 Thus, there was no connection between 
the expenditure of impact fee proceeds from the general fund and 
the impacts attributable to the new developments.355 Most of the suc-
cessful road fee cases involve the apportionment of fees based on im-
pact districts, or specific developments, rather than a blanket citywide 
fee and corresponding fund. 
Wastewater treatment is another essential and direct service to 
development.356With few exceptions, new homes produce additional 
wastewater. Because wastewater treatment facilities have finite capac-
ity, overburdened treatment plants pass on effluent to receiving bod-
ies of water with detrimental results.357 In K1'Ilpp v. Breckenridge Sanita-
tion District, for example, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a fee 
charged to new homes for the expansion of wastewater infrastructure 
because the fee was "reasonably related" to the impacts of the new 
development.358 Unlike many other impact fee cases, the court in 
Krupp determined that the Nollan/Dolan test was inapplicable.359 Even 
though the fee was used for general wastewater infrastructure, the 
District's use of a study to identify the capacity required by the new 
development helped convince the court that the fee was related to the 
legitimate interest of providing adequate wastewater treatment.360 
In City of Tarpon Splings v. Tarpon Splings Arcade Ltd., a Florida 
court invalidated a similar wastewater and sewer fee, but only because 
the ordinance provided no guidance for the building official to adjust 
the fee based on the particular impacts of a renovated home or to 
provide credits where sewer impacts have been reduced.361 Tar/Jon 
Splings Arcade again shows Florida's heightened concern with the par-
ticularization and proportionality element of an impact fee. This case, 
however, suggests a greater willingness to uphold a fee where a for-
mula or some individual assessment can be applied to ensnre that 
there is, in fact, an impact that warrants the fee.362 
354Id. 
355 /d. at 685-86. 
356 See Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P,3d 687, 690-91 (Colo. 2001). 
357Id. 
358 See id. at 692. 
359 See id. at 692, 695-98. 
360 See id. at 691-92. 
361 See City of Tarpon Springs v. Tarpon Springs Arcade Ltd., 585 So. 2d 324, 326-27 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
362 See id. This does, however, look more like a special assessment, which may explain 
the greater comfort the court has with it. Where an individual determination can be made, 
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2. Non-Exclusive Costs: Parks, Water Supply, and Schools 
Impact fees imposed to mitigate the costs of second-tier services 
face tougher challenges and are less likely to meet the needs/benefit 
tests applied in several states. These services are characteristically 
more "public" in nature.363 Moreover, second-tier services, such as, 
school expansion, park facilities, and water supply infrastructure, are 
more attenuated from traditional notions of services required to 
maintain the health, safety, and welfare of the community. The appli-
cation of the particularized benefit analysis to the school fee in G1'eater 
Franklin Developers Ass 'n v. Town of Fmnklin, illustrates the largely in-
surmountable standard used in Massachusetts.364 Unlike Volusia 
County v. Aberdeen at 01'1nond Beach, L.P., it was clear in Greater Fmnklin 
that new development was creating a need for new school facilities. 365 
Nonetheless, the Massachusetts court invalidated the school impact 
fee because non-fee payers' children would use the same facilities.366 
In Aberdeen, the court rationalized that, because the plaintiffs repre-
sented an age-restricted mobile home park where no school-aged 
children could live, the park should not be held to pay for the new 
facilities.367 But, in Greater H'ankin, the Massachusetts court instead 
looked to the benefits prong and emphasized that the new develop-
ment should not bear the cost of a service from which some members 
of the general public might benefit.368 
The school issue illustrates the challenge of imposing impact fees 
to pay for second-tier services; namely, the greater difficulty in identi-
fying precisely who benefits.369 In the case of roads and sewers, it is 
easy to see the direct benefit to the new developments for which they 
are provided. As the services provided by the fee become more gener-
alized, however, the chance of a public benefit increases. Although 
the elements are guaranteed to be satisfied. It is where costs of services must be general-
ized from the impacts of development that the court is reluctant to uphold the fee ordi-
nance. See id. 
363 For example, in Northeast Florida Builders, the court noted: "[Aln impact fee to be 
used to fund new schools is different from one required to build water and sewer facilities 
or even roads. Many of the new residents who will bear the burden of the fee will not have 
children who will benefit from the new schools." St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Build-
ers A~s'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. 1991). 
364 See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
365 See Greater Franklin Developers Ass'n v. Town of Franklin, 730 N.E.2d 900, 901 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2000). 
366 See id. at 902. 
367 See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
368 See GreatcrFrallklill, 730 N.E.2d at 902. 
369 See id. 
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some courts have allowed a "residual benefit," others state courts, like 
those in Massachusetts, have severely limited the scope of impact fees 
by requiring the benefit to be completely exclusive to fee payers.370 In 
Collier County v. State, the Florida Supreme Court similarly invalidated 
an attempt to recover fees for more generalized services like police, 
animal control, and recreation. 371 In Collier County, as in Greater Frank-
lin, whether the growth created the shortfall in funding was not at is-
sue; rather, the fee was invalidated because the services did not pro-
vide a direct benefit to the new development in a manner not shared 
by others in the conmumity.372 Even where the pressures of new de-
velopment created a need for increased services, the developers could 
not be held to pay for services that were not exclusive to their devel-
opment.373 
Surprisingly, in an earlier Florida case, Hollywood, Inc. v. B1'Owa1'd 
County, the court did uphold an impact fee used to expand a county-
wide park system to accommodate new development.374 This case was 
decided in 1983, before Nollan v. California Coastal Commission or Dolan 
v. City of Tiga1'd, but applied a similar regulatory takings analysis.375 In 
an impressive move, the court explicitly disagreed with the notion 
that sewers and roads are directly related to health, safety, and wel-
fare, but park lands are not.376 Moreover, the court upheld the fee be-
cause the County's method of collecting the fee was based on a "rea-
sonable" standard of a certain amount of parkland per capita.377 The 
park facilities financed by the fee thus directly corresponded to the 
number of new residents.378 In addition, the court was persuaded by 
evidence that the fees collected would be less than the total expense 
for new parks.379 Unlike the court in the later Collier County case, the 
court in Hollywood, a case decided sixteen years earlier, had evidence 
that the funds would be earmarked for the needed parks.380 The Hol-
lywood court, perhaps applying a more lenient standard, found that 
370 See id. 
371 See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
372 See id. 
373 See id. 
374 See Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983). 
375 See id. at 611-12. 
376 Id. at 613-14. 
377 Id. at 612-13. 
378Id. at 612. 
379 See id. 
380 Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 612. 
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the need for new parks was a direct consequence, and necessary 
benefit to, the new development. 
More recent cases in some states, however, suggest that more 
general infrastructure can be provided through the use of fees 
charged to new development. Unlike specific sewers or roads serving 
a new subdivision, the water source fee upheld by the Arizona Su-
preme Court in Home Builders of Central A1izona v. City of Scottsdale, was 
imposed to fund future development of water sources in Scottsdale.381 
The court explicitly declined to "plunge into the thicket of the levels 
of scrutiny [of a Nollan/Dolall analysis],"382 and was "reluctant to de-
prive the city of the flexibility needed to deal with these projects. "383 It 
is difficult to compare the holding in this case with the holdings un-
der a Dolan or needs/benefit analysis, but it does suggest a willingness 
of some courts to apply less scrutiny to legislatively adopted fees than 
adjudicative exactions. It also suggests that the scrutiny of the Nol-
lan/Dolan analysis is, in fact, heightened, and that the challenge this 
analysis poses to impact fees is not insignificant.384 
3. Indirect Costs: Community Development, Environmental Quality, 
and Social Services 
There are few examples of impact fees used to internalize the 
costs at the furthest ripples of development's impact on society. This 
perhaps is a conscious reflection of the legal challenges that state leg-
islatures and municipalities would face, the inability of municipalities 
to recognize the full costs of new development, or even a level of con-
stitutional recognition that, balanced against the perceived value of 
growth, some costs are so diffuse as to be only justifiably borne by the 
community as a whole. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that these 
costs do exist and that development continues to externalize them 
withont much recognition.385 
Although the case law on a broad range of impact fees is infor-
mative, the court's treatment of recreation fees in Ehrlich v. City of 
Culver City-among the more indirect costs of sprawl addressed by a 
381 Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale. 930 P.2d 993. 998 
(Ariz. 1997). 
382 Id. at 997. 
383 See id. at 1000. 
384 See id.; Ehrlich y. City of Culver City. 911 P.2d 429. 446-47 (Cal. 1996) (calling the 
Nollan/Dolan test a "heightened standard" requiring "intermediate scrutiny"). 
385 See discussion supra Part I.B.3. 
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fee-is problematic.386 The Ehrlich court invalidated the recreation fee 
because the fee was not "tied more closely to the actual impact of the 
land use change .... "387 Although the court was sympathetic to the 
notion that the city would have to go through some expense to create 
new recreational facilities, it found that the services provided by the 
fee were a type that "should be paid for either by the public as a whole 
•••. "388 Under the Nollan/Dolan analysis, the court remanded the case 
for a revaluation of the fee, suggesting that a fee more closely tailored 
to the impact of a particular project might be acceptable.389 
CONCLUSION 
Several constraints significantly prevent local governments from 
effectively internalizing the true costs of sprawl. Constitutionallimita-
tions-particularly protections against illegal taxes and uncompen-
sated, regulatory takings-ensure that private developers do not pay 
for public benefits. By taking a strict approach to the particularized 
benefit question, some courts have precluded fees that address any-
thing more than the most immediate and direct infrastructure 
needed to facilitate development. Courts and municipalities have 
been slow to recognize that more indirect services and costs incurred 
by the community as a result of sprawl development are necessary 
and, in fact beneficial, to new development. Where courts require 
that the collected fees be used exclusively for the benefit of new de-
velopment without any subsidiary benefit to the general public, these 
costs will continue to be borne by the public through taxes, passed on 
to state or federal programs, or spread among individuals in the form 
of lost amenities, private health costs, and other private social costs. 
Thus, fees will continue to provide the bare minimum of the facilities 
necessary for development, while continuing to support the externali-
zation of the full costs of sprawl. 
Where courts take a more liberal approach to the impact fee 
analysis, and allow benefits from fee spending to run to the larger 
community, there is a greater ability to account for the broader cost of 
sprawl. For this to occur, courts and legislatures will need to recognize 
the substantial evidence of the costs of sprawl and the growing body 
of literature on the full-cost accounting of development. In the aggre-
386 See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 445-46. 
387 [d. at 449. 
388 [d. 
389 See id. at 449-50. 
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gate, developments that contribute to sprawl impose costs on the 
larger community. Internalizing these more diffuse costs will inevita-
bly require communities to provide services that address the impacts 
felt by individuals, neighborhoods, and natural areas beyond the sub-
divisions that create them. To limit fee spending to the exclusive 
benefit of the payers is antithetical to the nature of the costs created 
by development. Only by recognizing that these costs have a nexus 
with new development and requiring government spending and serv-
ices that will address them on a community-wide scale, will states be 
able to increase the effectiveness of impact fees as a growth-
manage men t tool. 
Regardless of how broadly based fees can recoup costs, communi-
ties should be aware of just what costs are not being internalized by 
their fees. They should also recognize the extent to which the fees are 
accommodating and promoting growth that otherwise would not be 
able to occur without the necessary infrastructure. Although local 
government will not often have the luxury, in the short-term, of de-
ciding whether or not a particular development is built, long-term 
planning efforts and legislation, such as measures encouraging in-fill 
development and building within existing infrastructure, may be able 
to reduce development in areas unsupported by local services. 
Because many of these costs have been externalized as cities have 
sought to accommodate growth, a laudable approach in the name of 
smart growth is to force the internalization these costs. In other 
words, municipalities have sought to make those responsible for new 
development bear the costs associated with it. In an effort to reduce 
sprawl and its effects, however, impact fees might not be the cost re-
covery panacea. Indeed, impact fees have been used with varying suc-
cess around the country. Given the jurisprudential constraints dis-
cussed in this Comment, in many cases impact fees are unlikely to 
withstand judicial challenges when they attempt to recover the full 
costs of sprawl, or even any costs in excess of the most direct infra-
structure impacts. This may not seem like a reason to abandon the 
use of impact fees-is not recovering some costs better than recover-
ing none at all? 
If the fees could offset all of the negative impacts of growth, then 
accommodating growth would not be a problem. Although more re-
search is necessary to quan tilY the full costs of growth, it is clear that 
the impacts on open spaces, habitat, traffic, and the social fabric of 
communities are not perfectly fungible. Even if they were, the limita-
tions on impact fees would never permit the full recovery of these 
costs. The use of impact fees, however, may have an obvious side ef-
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feet. By allowing developers to pay for services that are not available, 
and could not be extended otherwise, municipalities run the risk of 
accommodating growth where it otherwise might not occur. When 
seeking to use fees as a growth management tool, local governments 
should carefully balance the costs of the long-term impacts of growth 
borne by the community against the short-term and limited costs re-
covered by the fees. 
